The empirics of regulatory reforms proxied by categorical variables:
recent findings and methodological issues
Andrea Bastianin

Paolo Castelnovo

Massimo Florio

University of Milan

University of Milan

University of Milan

April 2017
Abstract: Some regulatory reforms do not change just a specific signal that can be represented by a
quantitative continuous variable, such as a tax rate, a price cap, or an emission threshold. The standard
theory of reform in applied welfare economics (going back to contributions by e.g. Ramsey, Samuelson and
Guesnerie) asks the question: What is the marginal effect on social welfare of changing a policy signal?
However, reforms such as privatization, unbundling or liberalization of network industries are often
described by ‘packages’ shifting a policy framework. It is increasingly frequent in the empirical evaluation
of such reforms to use categorical variables, often in polytomous form, for instance describing unbundling
steps (vertical integration, accounting, functional, legal, ownership separation) on a discrete numerical scale,
such as those proposed by the OECD and other international bodies. We review recent econometric literature
evaluating regulatory reforms using such variables (40 papers) and we discuss some methodological issues
arising in this context.
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1. Introduction
Regulatory policy is often seen as one of the lever that policy makers can use to influence the
welfare of a country (OECD, 2010). The evaluation of regulatory reforms may seem
straightforward: governments should adopt only those that bring about social welfare
improvements. This implies that desirable reforms must yield economic and social benefits that
outweigh their costs (Coglianese, 2012). This seemingly simple description of the assessment of
policy reforms is backed-up by a vast and well-established literature in public economics (e.g.
Ramsey, 1927; Samuelson, 1986; Guesnerie, 1977; Diamond and Mirrlees, 1971; Drèze and Stern,
1990). See Boadway (2012) for a survey.
Although theoretical models in this strand of the literature, or those developed for the Cost
Benefit Analysis (CBA) of policies, are often mathematically and informationally complex, their
conceptual structure is quite simple (Guesnerie, 1998 and Florio, 2014). In models belonging to the
“Ramsey-Samuelson-Guesnerie” tradition (RSG, henceforth), a reform can be though as a change
to a vector of “signals”, defined as variables affecting the behavior and welfare of individuals and
firms, such as prices, rations, taxes, transfers and shareholding rights (Drèze and Stern, 1990).
In this framework one needs to model the functional relations linking government
objectives, signals, constraints and private agents’ reactions. The aim is to approximate how the
social welfare function changes in response to a marginal change in the vector of signals controlled
by the government.
Unfortunately, from the standpoint of an applied economist wishing to provide an empirical
evaluation of reforms, the RSG modeling approach is not without problems. Its main shortcoming is
that “a marginal change in the vector of signals” is frequently an inaccurate way of describing
actual policy reforms. In fact, reforms do not necessarily involve an immediate change of signals,
such as tax rates or regulated prices, nor an instantaneous variation in the social welfare function.
On the contrary, regulatory reforms are typically implemented with legislative packages that
encompass a variety of instruments such as: primary laws, secondary regulations, subordinate rules,
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standards, administrative guidance and circulars (OECD, 2010). For instance, in the case of the
European Union (EU), regulation of network services involves the adoption of both legislative and
non-legislative acts, the so-called soft law (Maresca, 2013),1 with complex implementation
mechanisms (Goldberg, 1976). Moreover, the aim of such tools and procedures is often not to
induce an immediate change in a signal, but rather to provide mechanisms that, under certain
circumstances, should pave the way for such a change.
A case in point is the regulation of segments of the telecom industry. For instance, “local
loop unbundling” in European member states gives the right to entrants to use the incumbent
telecom operator’s local broadband network to offer their services directly to customers.2 Clearly,
the implementation of such a legislation cannot be described as a change in the vector of signals
(Guthrie, 2006 and Nardotto et al., 2015). Rather, local loop unbundling can be interpreted as a
modification of the regulatory policy framework that is expected to create the conditions for a
change in signals and is thus not well approximated as a problem belonging to the RSG tradition.
We discuss the empirical assessment of “packages” or reforms of policy framework (PFR)
and focus on network industries, given the pervasiveness of the economic services they provide
(e.g. energy, water, telecommunications, transport). The aim is to provide a consistent analytical
scheme to help researchers and policy makers avoiding methodological pitfalls and interpretational
errors that might bias the evaluation of reforms when the RSG approach is neither applicable, nor
appropriate. We show that, notwithstanding the analysis of PFR cannot rely on well-established
theoretical foundations, such as the RSG approach, empirical analyses are feasible and necessary,
albeit interpretation of results and therefore design of policy recommendations requires caution.
1

Legislative acts (secondary law) comprise directives, regulations and decisions. Non-legislative acts include

communications, green papers, and white papers. These so-called “soft laws” provide a correct interpretation of the
primary and secondary laws. See Maresca (2013) and references therein.
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See Regulation (EC) No 2887/2000 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2000 on

unbundled access to the local loop.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets the conceptual framework,
definitions and mentions examples of policy categorical variables issued by the OECD (the ETCR
database) and by the Quality of Government Institute (a websiteportal collecting a large number of
indexes for many countries and years). Section 3 after proposing a prototype econometric model,
reviews some recent econometric literature using polytomous or binary regulatory reform variables
(40 papers). Section 4 discusses potential pitfalls and methodological issues in the above literature.
Section 5 concludes.

2. Conceptual framework
2.1 What are PFR in practice?
Although within the RSG tradition reforms are described as the marginal change of a vector of
signals and evaluated by assessing their impact on the social welfare function, they can take a rather
different shape. Let us consider the case of a government that approves a privatization bill as a
broad framework to progressively give up control of several State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) to
private investors.
To properly analyze these events, one should focus not only on microeconomic facts, such
as the transfer of shares’ ownership of some SOEs, nor search for ultimate macroeconomic changes.
In fact, privatization of SOEs, unbundling of network services, or access regulation are definitions
of sets of policies aimed at inducing a change in the current economic environment and possibly
affecting private agent’s utility. Hence, these measures are better described as “mesoeconomic”
changes (see Ng, 1992): they aim at changing the institutional setting and hence to induce a variety
of economy-wide effects in a certain direction.
In some cases, PFR are accompanied by an even more comprehensive change: a policy
paradigm shift, defined as a complete modification of the usual and accepted way of doing or
thinking about something, such as the theory supporting the government’s policy action. Since
paradigm shifts are hard to be quantitatively assessed and are best suited for interdisciplinary
3

analyses involving history and political science, they will not be discussed in what follows. On the
contrary, we focus on mesoeconomic changes induced by PFR showing that they can be the topic of
empirical analyses, albeit with due caution.
Up to now, we have defined PFR mostly relying on exclusion criteria. In fact, we have used
the term PFR to identify legislative or regulatory packages that are not necessarily translated into a
change in the vector of signals, that do not automatically and directly affect private agents’ utility
function and that cannot be analyzed within the RSG analytical framework. In the economic
literature, such reforms are often associated with the list of measures included in the Washington
Consensus (Williamson, 1994). However, the ten policy desiderata of Williamson (1994) do not
exhaustively represent a range of measures that can be put under the PFR header. Acemoglu et al.
(2008) list several measures that can be defined as PFR such as: opening to trade, financial
liberalization, judicial reform, privatization of state enterprises, reduction of entry barriers, tax
reform, removal of targeted industrial subsidies, and central bank independence.
Since providing a complete list of policies that represent PFR is neither feasible, nor
particularly informative, in this paper we equate PFR with the OECD’s (2012, p. 5) definition of
regulatory policy, namely: “regulatory policy is about achieving government's objectives through
the use of regulations, laws, and other instruments to deliver better economic and social outcomes
and thus enhance the life of citizens and business.”3 This definition is similar to the RSG
framework, but departs from it as it assumes a certain degree of complexity that cannot be captured
by a unique signal.

2.2 How are policy framework reforms measured?
When interpreting reforms within the RSG framework, empirical analyses require identifying a
change of signal, such as a tax-rate, a price, an interest-rate or an exchange-rate. In these cases,
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since most of the proxies of signals have natural unit of measurement, the main issue for the analyst
is to search for the appropriate variable.
On the contrary, to quantitatively assess the effects of PFR one needs to create or, resort to
existing artificial indicator variables that have no natural units of measurement. Two leading
examples of the PFR proxies are:
1. The OECD indicators of Energy, Transport and Communications Regulation (ETCR).
2. Indices of the quality of institutions (see e.g.: http://qog.pol.gu.se/).

The ETCR database. The ETCR dataset provides information about regulatory structures and
policies for OECD and some non-OECD countries. Information is collected with a questionnaire
sent to the government of each country and complemented with publicly available data to create
annual time series starting in the mid-1970s. Questionnaires are made of closed questions that can
either be answered with numerical values (e.g. what is the market share of the largest company in
the sector?), or by selecting from a set of pre-specified answers (e.g. a question that can be
answered with “yes” or “no”, such as: “is unbundling of the local loop required?”). Qualitative
information is coded into quantitative measures and then all answers are normalized in a range from
zero to six, where values near zero indicate fewer restrictions to competition.4 See Koske et al.
(2015).
As shown in Figure 1 the ETCR index aggregates with equal weights indices for seven
network sectors: telecom, electricity, gas post, air transport, rail transport, and road transport. For
each sector, there are up to four sub-indices that cover different dimensions of the reforms: entry
regulation, public ownership, vertical integration and market regulation. One of the strength of the
ETCR database is that indicators are available for a very long time span, making it suitable for
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score of zero if the share is smaller than 50%, three if it is between 50% and 90% and six if it is greater than 90%.
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panel data analysis, see Figure 2. The ETCR indices have been used as proxies of PFR by several
authors. See Tables 1-3.

Quality of institutions. The Quality of Government Institute maintains a dataset aimed at measuring
the trustworthiness, reliability, impartiality and the level of corruption of the public administration
and the judicial system in the United Nations member states. There are many categories, including:
quality of government (i.e. measures of impartiality, bureaucratic quality, corruption), judicial and
labor market indicators, indices of the freedom of the media, and economic indicators measuring
the involvement of the government in the economy. This kind of data are used in PFR literature (see
e.g. Borghi et al. 2016, Polemis and Stengos 2017), as well as in political economy studies (see e.g.
Obinger et al. 2016).

This list of empirical PFR proxies is clearly not exhaustive, but it is representative of the approach
often used in applied welfare economics.5 In fact, most of the PFR proxies have two features in
common: they are compiled by transforming quantitative and qualitative information into
normalized scores and are aggregated with a bottom-up approach. If score assignment and
aggregation is meaningful and consistent through time and space (e.g. across countries), one could
track the effects and intensity of reforms as illustrated in Figure 2. However, building such scoring
systems and aggregating them with bottom-up approaches involves several methodological and
interpretational issues that are the core topics of the following sections.

5

Other indicators with similar characteristics include: the set of Global Competitiveness indices compiled by the World

Economic Forum (2015) and many other used, or directly compiled, by scholars for their analyses (see e.g Erdogdu,
2011a; Prati et al., 2013; Koo et al., 2013; Grajek and Röller, 2012; Howard and Mazaheri, 2009). See also Tables 1-3.
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3. The econometrics of policy framework reforms
Empirical analyses can be divided into two distinct groups, depending on whether the PFR proxy
enters the econometric specification as dependent or as explanatory variable.6 The first class of
models, with PFR as dependent variable, is representative of the political economy literature on the
historical determinants, success and failure of reforms surveyed by Obinger et al. (2016).
On the contrary, here we focus on models where the PFR proxies enter as explanatory
variables. In these analyses, the outcome variable approximates the welfare change, that indirectly
reveals the belief of the analyst about the social welfare function. Oft-used dependent variables
include consumer or producer prices, productivity, quantity and quality of a service. Relying on
such variables is sensible, if the assumptions linking the selected dependent variable with the latent
“welfare change” are discussed before policy recommendations are formulated.
Consumer prices are the most straightforward and important signal for a welfare analysis
(Price and Hancock, 1998 and Florio, 2013). Although less orthodox, an alternative approach is to
rely on consumers’ satisfaction surveys to measure perceived welfare changes (see Clifton et al.,
2014 and Fiorio and Florio, 2011 among others). However, as shown in Table 2, many alternative
outcome variables that proxy the quality of the services have also been used.

3.1 A prototypical econometric model for PFR evaluation
Variables that are typically used as regressors in the evaluation of PFR can be denoted as: xi,t =
[x(1)i,t, x(1)i,t-j, yi,t-k ], where x(1)i,t  [ PFRi,t, Di,t, Si,t, Zi,t,] for j, k >0. PFRi,t is a set of proxies for the
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Here we focus on standard reduced-form regression models. An alternative, is to rely the so-called potential outcome

model (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005). In this setting, the focus is on the average change that a treatment (i.e. a PFR)
induces on a given outcome variable. Since the “change” is computed by comparing the outcome for treated and nontreated statistical units, the empirical analysis has to rely on counterfactuals (i.e. how the outcome of an average
untreated unit would change if it were to receive the treatment). See Imbens and Wooldridge (2009) for a review of the
econometrics of program evaluation.
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PFR, Di,t are demand-side controls, Si,t are supply-side controls, and Zi,t includes deterministic
regressors (e.g. time trend, individual and time effects) and additional controls (e.g. firm
characteristics). Notice that x(1)i,t might also include polynomial transformations and interaction
terms. From now on, for ease of notation, we drop the subscripts that index statistical units and
time, but we recall that GLM can be applied to cross-sectional, time-series or panel data. 7
Demand-side controls (D) directly impact on most outcome variables. When y is the price of
a good or service, natural candidates are the prices of its substitutes and per-capita income. Supplyside drivers (S) proxy the change in unit costs, that in turn are correlated with input prices (e.g. in
the case of electricity production, natural gas, coal, nuclear, hydro, solar, wind), and in the longerrun also with technological shifts. Thus the choice of the elements in S hinges on the analyst’s
knowledge of the technological features of the market under scrutiny.
Lastly, Z collects all the remaining controls, including deterministic regressors (time and
individual fixed effects, seasonal dummies, linear and polynomial trend terms) and other observable
characteristics (e.g. gender, location, being a listed company).
We can cast many of the empirical specifications used in the literature of PFR evaluation in
the class of generalized linear models (GLM):
g(E(y | x)) = x′y  LEF

(1)

where y is the outcome of interest, that can be a cross-sectional, time-series or panel
variable, x denotes the set of explanatory variables that includes also the PFR proxy,  is the vector
of unknown parameters, g(.) is called link function and LEF indicates a density belonging to linear
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We point out that the notation is somehow simplistic; in fact, we use x(1)i,t-j to indicate that the model can include lags

(not necessarily in the same number and order) of all or only some of the variables in x(1)i,t. Moreover, notice that
subscripts and the variables entering the set of regressors should be adjusted according to the nature of the dataset and
depending on the empirical specification. For instance, a static panel model would exclude yi,t-k.
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exponential family. Examples of LEF densities are the Bernoulli for binary data, the Poisson and
negative binomial for count data, and the Normal for continuous data (Gourieroux et al., 1984).
Combining different link functions and LEF densities yields a wide array of models
(McCullagh and Nelder, 1989). For illustrative purposes, let   E(y | x) and   g(). The role of
the link function g(.) is to map E(y | x) to  = x′ . When g(.) is the identity function  = ;
moreover, if y is a continuous normally distributed variable, such as (the log of) the electricity price,
we get the linear regression model: E(y | x) = x′ . If y is a binary variable with Bernoulli
distribution, such as consumers’ satisfaction (e.g. y = 1 corresponds to “satisfied”, y = 0 means “not
satisfied”), we can obtain both the Probit and the Logit models.8 Therefore, as it can be seen from
Tables 1-3, the GLM approach encompasses all the specifications commonly used in the
econometric literature of PFR evaluation in network industries.

3.2 PFR in network industries: a short review
We briefly discuss some of the contributions that have dealt with the empirical assessment of PFR
in network industries. Most of the selected studies relies on panel data, while a minority focuses
only on the time series (Bacchiocchi et al. 2005, 2008) or cross-section dimension (Fiorio et al.
2013 and Nardotto 2015). A summary is shown in Tables 1-3.
Two classes of models have been used. Linear models, when the dependent variable is
continuous, such as log-prices, log-productivity and GDP growth (e.g. Hyland 2016; Borghi et al.
2016, Prati et al. 2013). Models for limited dependent variables, when the outcome variable is a
dummy, such as consumers’ satisfaction or energy deprivation (Fiorio and Florio 2011, Fiorio et al.
8

Both the Probit and Logit models are conditional probability models of the form, Pr(yit = 1 | xit) = h(xit′ ), where h(.) is

a function that ensures that the Pr(.) is a well-defined probability. The Logit model is obtained when g(.) is the logit
function, such that  = ln[/ (1 - )] and E(y | x) = exp(x′) / [1+ exp(x′)]. The Probit model is obtained when g(.) is
the inverse of the standard Normal cumulative distribution function (cdf). Then  = -1() and E(y | x) = (x′), where
 is the standard Normal cdf.
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2013, Florio and Poggi, 2010). Although the GLM framework subsumes both approaches and can
be applied to any data structure, for the sake of brevity, here we focus on panel data and discuss
only linear models. Some assumptions and results used in the analysis of linear specifications are
easily extended to models for limited dependent variables. See Cameron and Trivedi (2005) for
details. Moreover, we notice that implementation of both linear and limited depended variables
models requires the analyst to make two choices: first, how to model the heterogeneity of statistical
units and, second, between static or dynamic specifications.
Using Equation (1) under the assumption that the link function g(.) is the identity function
and that the outcome variable is normally distributed, we get a linear one-way error component
model for panel data:
yit =  + xit′ + uit

for i = 1,…, N; t = 1,…,T

uit = i + it

(2)
(3)

where, uit is the error term, i is the unobservable individual-specific effect that accounts for
the heterogeneity among statistical units, it is the remainder disturbance.
The model in (2) and (3) encompasses most of the linear panel data specifications in the
analyses shown in Tables 1-3. Either fixed or random effects are used to account for the
heterogeneity among statistical units. Unobservable individual-specific effects, i, are assumed to
be fixed parameters to be estimated in the fixed effects (FE) model. The FE model is appropriate
when the aim is to focus on a specific set of statistical units, say N countries, and inferences are
conditional on those N units. The FE model is thus a conditional analysis: it delivers consistent
estimates of the effects of PFR on the outcome variable conditional on the individual-fixed effects

i and makes prediction feasible only for the N units in the sample.
In the random effects (RE) model unobservable individual-specific effects, i, are assumed
to be a stochastic variable. The RE model is appropriate when N statistical units have been
randomly drawn from a large population and those N units are a representative sample of the
10

underlying population. A case in point is the analysis of household survey data. The RE
specification is an example of marginal or population-weighted analysis: inferences pertain to the
population from which the sample has been drawn and prediction is also feasible for units outside
the sample.
In the FE model the individual-effects, i, are potentially correlated with the observed
regressors xit. On the contrary, the consistency of estimates in the RE model depends on the
assumption that i are distributed independently from xit. We can see that Tables 1-3 display more
FE than RE models: in fact, this stronger condition is often untenable in the evaluation of PFR.
We now turn to the choice between static and dynamic specifications. Since most economic
relations are not static in nature, dynamic specifications are often a natural choice and are
implemented in 20 out of 40 surveyed studies. In panel data models there are two sources of
correlation over time. The first, due to unobserved heterogeneity, arises because of the observation
of the same individual over multiple time periods. The second, true state dependence, occurs when
correlation over time is due to the causal mechanism explaining the fact that yit is determined by yit-j
for j > 0. The unobserved heterogeneity explanation implies that the correlation over time is
constant. This is clearly restrictive when an unobserved shock this period will affect the behavioural
relationship for some periods and whose effect is not constant over time. An example are models
describing prices or investment decisions (e.g. Brau et al. 2005, Alesina et al. 2005).
In such cases, some dynamics can be introduced using a distributed lag structure for the
explanatory variables of interest, including the lagged dependent variable among the regressors (e.g.
Fiorio and Florio, 2013), or capturing serial correlation assuming an autoregressive process for the
error term of the model, it, (e.g. Howard and Mazaheri, 2009). Neglecting the effect of lagged
dependent variables or, more generally the presence of serial correlation, may distort inferences and
lead to overestimation of the effect of all variables, including PFR proxies.
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Prices. Having discussed the methodology, we now organize the discussion around the nature of the
outcome variable. Being the most important signal for welfare analysis the main strand of the
literature focuses either on end-users or on wholesale prices. Empirical evidence on the impact of
reforms on prices is mixed, largely depending on the characteristics of the countries where they are
implemented. See Table 1.
As far as the electricity sector is concerned, Bacchiocchi et al. (2015) show that
liberalizations are associated with lower electricity prices for the EU15 countries, but with higher
prices in New Member States. However, according to Hyland (2016), after controlling for the
possible endogeneity of reforms, that arises because prices might be a push factor for reforms,
market restructuring does not impact on wholesale electricity prices in EU27. Focusing on
developing countries, Nagayama (2007, 2009) shows that, contrarily to expectations, liberalizations
are associated with industrial and residential electricity prices increases (Nagayama, 2009).
Moreover, while single regulatory reforms are not associated with significant price changes, the
coexistence of an independent regulator and unbundling tends to correlate with lower prices, but it
is not possible to identify a common pattern across countries (Nagayama, 2007). Similarly, the
analysis carried out by Erdogdu (2011b) on a sample of 62 countries suggests that the sign and
magnitude of the association between different reform steps and electricity price-cost margin varies
greatly across countries. Fiorio and Florio (2013) focus specifically on changes in corporate
ownership implementing a variety of static and dynamic panel data model. They show that while
the impact of liberalisation on prices is small and uncertain, public ownership is associated with
lower residential electricity prices in EU15 countries.
The impact of regulatory reforms on prices has also been assessed in other network
industries, reporting heterogeneous findings but pointing out to a limited, if not detrimental, role of
privatizations per se. Brau et al. (2010) highlight that EU gas industry privatizations do not lead to
benefits for consumers, but that some price lowering effects can be imputed to the softening of the
entry legislation. Growitsch and Stronzik (2014) show that in the EU legal ownership unbundling of
12

natural gas transmission networks is associated with lower end-user prices while privatizations lead
to a price increase. Finally, Bacchiocchi et al. (2011), focusing on EU telecommunications, report
that regulation is associated with price reductions, while privatizations seems to play no significant
role in explaining the price of international, national, local calls, and connection charges.

Productivity, investment and other performance variables. As shown in Table 2, a second and very
diffuse strand of the literature deals with the evaluation of the impact of reforms on productivity,
investment decisions and various measures of the quality of the service provided.
A first subset of studies focused on the impact of reforms on different macroeconomic
aggregates. Prati et al. (2013) analyse the impact of trade, agriculture, network, and financial
reforms on GDP growth for a sample of over ninety developing and developed countries. While
reforms are positively correlated with growth, the association between liberalization in network
industries (telecom and electricity) and growth is not statistically distinguishable from zero.
Bacchiocchi et al. (2005, 2008), relying on time-series techniques, show that while UK
privatizations had no long-run impact on output, public expenditure has been sustained by their
proceeds, that have also temporarily boosted investments. A positive effect on investment was
found also by Alesina et al. (2015), who show that entry liberalization and privatization in OECD
countries had positive long-run effects on investment in the electricity, gas, water, communications,
post, transport and storage sectors. On the other hand, Gugler et al. (2013) analyze the impact of
regulations on aggregate investments in generation, distribution and transmission assets in 16
European countries, providing a mixed evidence. Their results indicate that the establishment of a
wholesale market or free choice of supplier boosts investment, while unbundling tends to decrease
aggregate investment spending by adversely affecting the incumbent company. Consistently, Nardi
(2012) shows that the correlation between ownership unbundling and investment in the electricity
network is statistically indistinguishable from zero, once the lagged value of the dependent variable
is included in the model. Grajek and Röller (2012), focusing on the telecommunications industry,
13

analyse the impact of entry regulation on investment decisions of over 70 fixed-line operators in 20
European countries. They highlight that entry regulation discourages investment by both
incumbents and entrants. Cambini and Rondi (2010) focus on the investment decisions of 23 energy
utilities in five EU countries. They show that investment rate is lower under rate of return regulation
than under incentive regulation.
Concerning R&D expenditure, research analysed suggests a negative impact of
liberalization reforms. Kim et al. (2012) analyse a panel of 70 electricity-generating firms located in
15 OECD countries and show that entry liberalization is negatively associated with their level of
R&D expenditure. Erdogdu (2013), focusing on a panel of 27 developed countries shows that
reforms are negatively associated with government spending in energy R&D activities.
Looking at environmental outcomes, two recent studies by Asane-Otoo (2016) and Clò et al.
(2017) analyse the impact of reforms on greenhouse gas emissions and intensity. Asane-Otoo
(2016) studies the relationship between restructuring policies and greenhouse gas emissions from
the electricity sector in OECD countries and shows that emission intensity is negatively correlated
with the degree of competition. In the case of 27 European countries, Clò et al. (2017) find that an
increase in public ownership is associated with an improvement of environmental performance both
before and after the introduction of the Emissions Trading System.
Productivity issues are debated by Pompei (2013), who shows that, for a panel of 19 EU
countries, the increased stringency of entry regulation is negatively associated with total factor
productivity (TFP) growth in the electricity sector. Borghi et al. (2016), focusing on a panel dataset
of electricity distribution firms operating in 16 European countries, show that in countries with poor
quality of institutions, public ownership is associated with lower TFP, while where the quality of
government is higher public ownership and TFP are positively correlated. Bottasso and Conti
(2010) analyse the impact of motorway networks on output for a panel of twenty-one manufacturing
and service sectors of eleven EU countries. They show that the elasticity of output with respect to
motorway is lower in countries where the degree of entry barriers is higher.
14

As far as the quality of service is concerned, empirical evidence tends to confirm that
reforms aiming to foster competition usually have beneficial effects, while a simple shift from
public to private ownership did not lead to substantial gains. This is what emerges from the work of
Zhang et al. (2008) which, using a panel of 36 developing countries, demonstrate that privatization
and regulation do not lead to higher electricity generation and installed generation capacity, but
competition is associated with performance improvements. Similar conclusions are drawn by Koo
et al. (2013), which analyse the effect of private participation in the power service sector on the
electric power transmission and distribution losses in 35 developing countries. They show that the
efficiency of the power service is negatively correlated with private participation. Polemis (2016),
focusing on 30 OECD countries, shows that the association between privatisation and electricity
performance (labour productivity and installed capacity) is either negative or statistically
indistinguishable from zero. Erdogdu (2011a), relying on a panel dataset of 92 developed and
developing countries, shows that the efficiency boosting impact of reforms in the power sector is
limited at best. Among the studies supporting a positive impact of reforms on service quality we
include Zhang et al. (2005), which provide evidence that in developing countries electricity
generation and installed generation capacity increase in the presence of an independent regulatory
authority. Moreover, they show that the sequence of reforms matters: the introduction of
competition before privatization leads to greater gains in terms of electricity generation and
installed generation capacity. Polemis and Stengos (2017) focus on the electricity performance, as
measured by capacity, generation, and productivity for 30 OECD countries. Using a static panel
threshold fixed effect model, they split countries into two groups: liberalized and non-liberalized.
For the latter group, they find that electricity performance is positively influenced by structural
reforms. Nepal et al. (2010) study the association between ownership unbundling and quality of
service for 29 electricity distribution networks in New Zealand, finding that duration and frequency
of supply interruptions in electricity distribution network is negatively associated with ownership
unbundling.
15

Focusing on the telecommunication industry, Howard and Mazaheri (2009) show that
neither privatizing, nor liberalizing the market spur the diffusion of information and communication
technologies (ITCs). However, increasing the ‘de jure’ independence of the regulatory authority has
beneficial effects for the diffusion of ITCs. Briglauer (2014) shows that for a panel of EU27
countries the adoption of fiber-based broadband services is negatively correlated with the
effectiveness of previous regulation. In a subsequent work the author shows that this negative
correlation is explained by the fact that mandatory access regimes have a negative impact on
investments and hence, indirectly, on fiber-based broadband adoption (Briglauer, 2015). Nardotto et
al. (2015) show that in the UK local loop unbundling has increased the quality of service, as
measured by the download speed of broadband internet connection. Belloc et al. (2013) analyse a
panel of 22 European countries and show that liberalizations in the telecommunication industry are
positively associated with the year-on-year change of market share of entrants, especially in the
presence of an independent regulatory authority.

Customer satisfaction. While the previous analyses focus on what can be thought to be the
determinants of the quality of services, an alternative approach is to use consumers’ satisfaction
surveys to directly measure perceived welfare changes (see e.g. Clifton et al., 2014). See Table 3.
Florio and Poggi (2010) analyse how electricity and natural gas market reforms affect the
probability of EU households struggling to pay bills. The authors show that while the probability of
deprivation is positively affected by privatization, the effect of liberalization is not statistically
distinguishable from zero. Fiorio and Florio (2011) show that consumers’ satisfaction is higher in
countries where the market is liberalized and characterized by large public ownership of the
electricity industry. Fiorio et al. (2013) show that local public transport users’ satisfaction is higher
in cities where local transportation is managed by a monopolistic, integrated service organization.
Ferrari et al. (2011) analyse the 2002 wave of the Eurobarometer survey with a multilevel random
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effect model and show that customers’ satisfaction is negatively associated with privatization and
liberalization in the telecommunication, energy and transport.

4. Potential pitfalls and suggestions for the empirics of PFR
Studies in Tables 1-3 rely on several PFR proxies. The process of building such variables is prone
to several types of errors that can be grouped into three main categories:
i.

Conceptual errors;

ii.

Discretization, definition of orderings and metrics.

iii.

Aggregation errors.

These three issues cause a broader class of empirical problems that goes under the header of
measurement error. Moreover, given the nature of PFR proxies, interpretation of results requires
some caution. This section discusses issues (i-iii), measurement error and provides suggestions for
the interpretation of results in empirical analyses of PFR.

Conceptual errors. When researchers look for variables that can approximate PFR, the risk of
introducing conceptual errors is high. Although PFR proxies might not represent the analogous of
signals in the RSG context, appropriate measures can be defined. Unbundling, for instance, can be
thought as a categorical variable with an ordering going from full vertical integration, to complete
unbundling. This is a relatively simplistic but consistent way of identifying the sequence of
legislative acts that trigger the unbundling process. The proxy in fact identifies a new state of the
economy, with accounting, legal and functional unbundling of a given industry.
Interpretational and identification problems arise when the variable designed as a PFR indicator
might also be the outcome of some macroeconomic shock. A case in point, is the HerfindahlHirschman index of concentration, or more simply reliance on the market share of the largest
service provider in a country.
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While these variables are in principle legitimate PFR proxies, their interpretation largely
depends on the ingenuity of the researcher. The market share of, say, the largest electricity
generator, is part of the policy and can be used as a PFR proxy when the regulator forces the
incumbent to divest generation capacity. On the contrary, if the market share has changed in
response to an exogenous technological shock that altered the optimal production plan not only for
the incumbent, but for any firm in a sector, the validity of the PFR proxy is questionable. In this
case, the technological shock is a confounding factor that causes an omitted variable bias and hence
ultimately affects the evidence in favor or against the reform.
Thus, if available, control variables should mitigate the omitted variable problem. These
problems can also be addressed with a set of robustness checks, where alternative PFR proxies are
used.

Discretization, definition of orderings and metrics. Discretization is the process of converting a
continuous variable into a discrete one. In the definition of any scoring system, criteria for building
indicators starting from raw information are needed. When the underlying data are continuous,
discretization may or may not have alternatives. In practice, most PFR variables, such as those in
the ETCR or in the GCI databases, rely on a multidimensional, often discrete, scale.
The reason for relying on discretized variables is due to the complexity of finding a unit of
measure for PFR proxies. While discretization might apparently make the analysis easier, it has
many drawbacks (Rucker et al., 2015). First, potentially useful variability is discarded; second,
when the PFR is used as an explanatory variable, this loss of variability reduces the precision of insample and out-of-sample predictions. In the extreme case of summarizing PFR with a dichotomic
variable, there might be a substantial reduction in statistical power, that increases the chance of both
type-I (i.e. false positive) and type-II error (i.e. false negative). Moreover, Lien and Balakrishnan
(2005) show that dichotomization of the independent variable reduces goodness-of-fit and may
increase or decrease the regression slope. Dichotomization leads also to interpretational issues. In
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fact, using a dummy variable within a panel regression to measure, say an anti-monopoly policy,
implies that competition increases by the same magnitude in all countries. Lastly, discretization is
often arbitrary. In fact, original data often do not provide guidance for the design of intervals to be
used for the definition of the scoring system. In such cases, collapsing scores into a dichotomic
variable, or aggregating them in very wide brackets might be a viable strategy. Overall, there is a
clear trade-off between statistical variability and discretization error. As it can be seen in Tables 13, several studies have pursued this approach, recoding the discrete PFR proxy into a dichotomic
variable. See Bacchiocchi et al. (2015), Growitsch and Stronik (2014) and Nagayama (2007) among
others.
Discretization might also lead to issues in the definition of orderings and metrics. The first
difficulty arises when there are several viable PFR, but according to an ideal path that goes from
“less ambitious or advanced” to the “most ambitious or advanced” none of them represents a winwin option. Coding such information is a very complicated task. A further issue arises when a
categorical variable implies considering ordinal data as cardinal. In these cases, it may even be
preferable to shrink the information into a dichotomic variable, dramatically reducing the error, but
also losing information and variability. Alternatively, as suggested by Fiorio and Florio (2011), one
might check whether results critically depend on the cardinalisation adopted.

Aggregation. There are usually no valid economic criteria to guide the aggregation of different PFR
indicators using bottom-up approaches. For this reason, equal weights are often assigned to
different aspects of PFR and upper-level indices are simple averages or sums of the lower-level
variables. See Figure 1. This might bias estimates, affect inference and influence the evaluation of
PFR; in fact, aggregate reform scores depend on arbitrarily selected equal weights.
The problem can be either attenuated, by relying on data-reduction techniques, or
completely avoided, by using only lower-level indicators. In this case, one PFR proxy will be
interpreted as the variable of interest and the remaining as controls. Data-reduction techniques, such
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as Principal Component Analysis, have been successfully used to calculate weights and synthetic
PFR proxies in many settings (see e.g. Ferrari and Manzi, 2014; Florio and Poggi, 2010). However,
if on the one hand they easily lead to a weighing scheme, on the other hand they are a-theoretical,
leave no control to the analyst and are severely affected by the presence of outlying observations. A
further alternative is to check the robustness of results to different weighting schemes with a
random weights analysis (Koske et al., 2015).
Besides problems related to the weighting scheme, the use of aggregate PFR measures in
place of sub-indices lead to a loss of information, since it does not allow to identify the effects
resulting from distinct aspects of the regulation.

Measurement error, ME. Measurement error (ME) identifies any deviation from the true value of
variable that arises in the definitional or measurement stage (Asher, 1974) and therefore subsumes
all the issues discussed so far. Mismeasurement is likely to be particularly severe in the case of PFR
proxies since they rely on several non-standard data sources such as media coverage, legal and nonlegal acts and expert surveys.
Misreporting by subjects, coding and other errors, such as those discussed above, are likely
to inflate ME.9 As Blackwell et al. (2015) point out, also missing data are a limiting special case of
mismeasurement that arises when there is no prior information about the true unobserved values of
the variable of interest. Moreover, even in the presence of correctly measured variables, what we
called “conceptual errors” are another source of ME. In fact, observed data often do not correspond
to the exact concept the analyst is interested in (e.g. the use of years of schooling as a proxy for
human capital).
ME can be purely random or have both a casual and a nonrandom component. Nonrandom
ME arises when the deviation from the true value of variable is systematically influenced by some
9

See the surveys in Angrist and Krueger (1999), Bound et al. (2001), Cameron and Trivedi (2005), and Hausman

(2001).
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factors that introduce an upward or downward bias in the observations. Examples include the fact
that data are often more accurate for some countries than for others (Albouy, 2012), or that long
time series are more precisely measured in the present than in the past.10 A purely random white
noise ME, is less worrisome than the nonrandom case for at least two reasons. First, econometric
techniques for estimating its effects are better developed (see e.g. Asher, 1974; Cameron and
Trivedi, 2005). Second, contrarily to the nonrandom error case, it tends to average out in aggregate
data, such as macroeconomic variables. This also explains why the literature on “error-in-variables”
has developed in parallel with the increasing availability of micro-level cross-sectional and panel
databases (Angrist and Krueger, 1999).
There are many factors that determine the magnitude and the sign of the effect of ME on
inferences, including: its nature (classical or non-classical, random or nonrandom), whether
mismeasurement affects the dependent and/or the one, or more, independent variables, whether the
variable is continuous or not, the nature of the model (bivariate or multivariate, linear or nonlinear),
the nature of the dataset (cross-sectional or panel data).
A benchmark case involves a continuous cross-sectional variable subject to classical ME of
additive form. In this setting, instead of observing the true variable of interest, we observe a proxy
that is the sum of the latent variable and a white noise error term that is independent of both the
correctly measured variable and the regression error.11
Depending on the aim of the analysis a given PFR proxy can be used either as the dependent
or as an independent variable in a linear regression. Classical ME in the dependent variable leads to
less precise least squares estimates, but does not introduce any bias (Angrist and Krueger, 1999).
On the contrary, when there is a single regressor subject to classical ME, least squares estimates
10

Gallop and Weschle (2017) provide a thorough discussion of the topic and develop a sensitivity analysis approach

that can be used to conduct robustness analysis of inferences in the presence of nonrandom measurement error.
11

More formally, suppose that we are interested in yi =  xi* + ui, but instead of observing the correctly measured

variable xi*, we only have data on xi = xi* + i, where i  (0 , v), and cov(xi*,i) = cov(ui,i) = 0.
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will be downward biased and inconsistent. While adding more controls not contaminated by
measurement issues, will decrease the magnitude of the attenuation bias (i.e. the bias toward zero
coefficient of the mismeasured variable), the inconsistency problem remains and extends also to the
coefficients of the other regressors, but for them the sign of the bias is not predictable. Similarly, if
there is more than one explanatory variable measured with error, estimates are still inconsistent but
the sign of the bias is not known a priori (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005). Lastly, going back to the
case of a single mismeasured regressor, it can be shown that the inclusion of polynomial terms will
generally inflate the size of the attenuation bias (Griliches and Ringstad, 1970). This case is relevant
since researchers often include quadratic terms to capture nonlinearities relating PFR proxies with
the outcome of interest (Alesina et al., 2005; Erdogdu, 2011).
Given the prevalence of panel data analyses in the literature on the empirical evaluation of
PFR it is legitimate to ask what happens if the reform proxy is contaminated by classical ME.
Griliches and Hausman (1986) show that, since panel variables are typically positively correlated
over time, the attenuation bias in the fixed effect model is larger than in the cross-sectional case.
Moreover, they show that relying on first-differenced data to remove fixed effects yields a larger
attenuation bias than when running the regression on the level of variables.
Classical ME is a useful benchmark, but the underlying assumptions are often not met by
most widely used PFR proxies. For instance, variables in the ETCR database represent scores in a
finite interval and are often transformed into a 0-1 dummy (see Tables 1-3). Clearly, neither scores,
nor dummy variables are consistent with the classical ME assumptions. In fact, when the
mismeasured variable is binary, ME cannot be independent of the correctly measured values of the
variables. A dummy, can only be misclassified in one of two directions: a true “zero” classified as
“one” or a true “one” classified as “zero”. The sign of the error depends on the true unobserved
variable. Similarly, in the case of a score that can take on only some values in an interval. In a
bivariate linear regression setting, a mismeasured dummy variable still leads to an attenuation bias,
but generalizations of these results to other settings are not possible (Card, 1996).
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In general, when moving from linear to non-linear models with classical or nonclassical ME
(such as probit or Poisson specifications) characterization of its effects becomes much harder.
Moreover, while instrumental variable estimation often provides a solution to the problem in linear
models, it does not deliver consistent estimates in a nonlinear regression framework. In this setting,
neither the linear, nor the nonlinear form of two-stage least squares estimator leads to consistent
estimates of coefficients. See Bound et al. (2001), Hausman (2001) and Schennach (2016) for a
survey of ME in nonlinear models.
While there is no panacea for ME, visual inspection of data may sometimes help spotting
outliers. In such cases, trimming (i.e. dropping observations with outlying values) and winsorizing
(i.e. capping outlying data points) can be used to deal with outliers and various form of
measurement error (Angrist and Krueger, 1999).12 Alternatively, if one is willing to make some
simplifying assumptions both classical and non-classical ME can be addressed with ad-hoc
estimators.13
Lastly, let us consider the ideal case when both the outcome variable and the PFR proxy are
correctly measured. Should we omit other relevant variables because they might be measured with
error? No, because we would simply substitute the bias due to ME with an “omitted variable bias”.
Moreover, McCallum (1972) has shown that using a proxy of a latent variable will induce a smaller
asymptotic bias than simply dropping the variable from the model.

Interpretation of results. Within the GLM framework the interpretation of estimated coefficients,
from a purely statistical point of view, is relatively straightforward. In fact, a key feature of GLM is
that the conditional mean is of the single-index form, meaning that it is a nonlinear function of a
linear combination of regressors and parameters, x′ . When it is also a monotonic function,
12

Lien and Balakrishnan (2005) discuss the relative merits of trimming and winsorizing for in-sample inference.

13

Since the literature on the topic is very diffuse, it cannot be surveyed here. The interested reader is referred to Bound

et al. (2001), Hyslop and Imbens (2001), Schennach (2016) and references therein.
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interpretation of regression results is further facilitated, even if the conditional mean is non-linear,
as in the case of Logit and Probit models. More precisely, it can be shown that the ratio of
coefficients for two different regressors equals the ratio of the marginal effects and that the sign of
the coefficient gives the sign of the marginal effect (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005).
However, economic interpretation requires more caution. First, since any empirical
specification omits some relevant, but possibly unavailable explanatory variable, the error term will
pick-up the influence of such omissions; for this reason, estimates should not be given a causal
reading. Rather, the estimate of coefficient associated with the PFR proxy represents the conditional
correlation (or association) between the reform and the outcome variable of interest.
In some cases, interpretational issues might arise even if there is an observable signal that
allows the researcher to cast his analysis of PFR within the RSG theoretical framework. Assume
that the PFR can be measured with a continuous time-series variable representing privatization
proceeds for the Treasury. If the aim of the government is to reduce the country’s indebtedness by
selling SOEs, then a positive estimated coefficient, showing that per-capita GDP increases for each
additional euro of privatization proceeds, represents evidence in favour of the reform (see e.g.
Bacchiocchi et al. 2005, 2008). Alternatively, suppose that the government aims at privatizing
because private ownership is assumed to improve the efficiency of a strategic sector of the
economy. In this case, since governments might even want to under-price SOEs, cash proceeds
would not be an appropriate signal. An indicator variable might thus be a better PFR proxy (e.g. a
dummy equal to one in the case of full public ownership, and zero otherwise). While reliance on
discontinuous scores induces a loss of variability, it is nevertheless the best available information
that the analyst can use, given the aim of the government. In this case the coefficient associated
with the PFR variable should be read as an estimate of a structural break induced by the reform.
It is useful to point out that the use of dummy variables is potentially subject to other issues.
First, care should be taken when interpreting results when the dependent variable is logtransformed. The coefficients of dummy variables cannot be given the interpretation of elasticities,
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as in the case of continuous regressors. Second, in the case of a semi-logarithmic model, the
percentage change in Y due to a discrete change in D from 0 to 1 is in fact given by p = 100 ×
(exp{c} – 1); however, using the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimate of c, denoted as 𝑐̂ , yields a
biased estimator for p. A better solution is to rely on 𝑝̂ = 100 × [exp{𝑐̂ – 0.5 𝑉̂ (𝑐̂ )} -1 ], where 𝑉̂ (𝑐̂ )
is the OLS estimate of the variance of 𝑐̂ (Kennedy, 1981). Among the surveyed study only Nepal et
al. (2016) have addressed this issue as suggested.

5. Concluding remarks
This paper has reviewed the econometrics of policy framework reforms starting from the distinction
between the theory of reform à la RSG and the problem of evaluating PFR when these cannot be
read as a marginal change to a specific economic signal.
This distinction clearly matters when carrying out empirical analyses of reforms in network
industries, given that we have highlighted that PFR assessment is particularly prone to both
methodological and interpretational errors. Moreover, the interpretation of estimated coefficients
differs, because usually it is not meaningful to express them as marginal changes of the variable of
interest, but rather as a transition from a policy regime to another.
The punchline of our analysis is that even if going from the theory to empirics of PFR might
be challenging, their empirical evaluation is an essential task for supporting policy making
activities. In fact, the quantitative measurement of how social welfare responds to a change of
circumstances, such as those implied by a PFR, is a not only at the core of applied welfare
economics, but also a necessity, in that “evaluation of regulatory outcomes informs policy makers
of successes, failures and the need for change or adjustment to regulation so that it continues to
offer effective support for public policy goals” (OECD, 2010, p. 9). This point is stressed also by
Parker and Kirkpatrick (2012) who highlight that “evidence on the outcomes of regulatory policies
should help policymakers design regulatory measures that work better”. Further research is
therefore needed to understand how to address the methodological issues discussed in this paper.
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We have suggested how to avoid some potential pitfalls and reviewed some findings based on
proxy variables of regulatory reforms.
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Figure 1. Structure of the OECD’s Energy, Transport and Communications Regulation (ETCR) database.

Notes: The ETCR index aggregates with equal weights indices for seven network sectors: telecom, electricity, gas, post, air transport, rail transport,
and road transport. For each sector, there are up to four sub-indices that cover different dimensions of the reforms: entry regulation, public ownership,
vertical integration and market regulation. We show the underlying questionnaire for the gas sector. Numbers are sector, topic and question weights
used for aggregation purposes.
Source: authors’ elaboration using data in Koske et al. (2015).
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Figure 2. Trends of ECTR reform indicators in EU-15 countries for the natural gas industry, 1975 – 2013.

Notes: each panel shows one of the Indicators of Energy, Transport and Communications Regulation (ETCR), for individual EU15 countries (dots),
the median value of the indicator (line) and the interquartile range, (IQR, shaded area). ECTR reform indicators score from 0 to 6.
Source: authors’ calculation on data sourced from the ETCR database maintained by the OECD (Koske et al., 2015).
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Table 1. Summary of empirical analyses of the effect of PFR in network industries: prices as dependent variable.
Sample

Model

Countries

Period

Industry

EU15

199703

T

Dependent variable
loc., int., nat. P, and
connection charges

Bacchiocchi et
al. (2015)

EU27

199011

E

Brau et al.
(2010)

EU15

199107

Erdogdu (2011b)

62 countries

Fiorio and Florio
(2012)

PFR proxy

Estimator

Dynamic

Description

Transf.

Source

IV FE

No

PO, MS, ARI

log

OECDETCR

P households

FE

No

ER, VI, PO, ARI

Dummy, log

OECDETCR

Liberalization associated with lower P for
the EU15 countries, but higher P for the
NMS.

E

P households

GMM

Yes

VI, ER, PO, MS

-

OECDETCR

Loosening entry regulation reduces P

198209

E

Electricity end use fuel cost margin;
Cross subsidy levels

FE, RE

No

Composite reform
score

-

various

No uniform pattern; impact of different
reform steps varies greatly across
countries.

EU15

197807

E

P households

FE, GMM

Yes

ER, VI, PO and a
combination of those
indices

dummy

OECDETCR

Public ownership associated with lower
residential electricity prices

Growitsch and
Stronzik (2014)

18 EU
countries

198907

G

P households

FE, GMM

Yes

VI, ER, PO, legal
and ownership
unbundling

Dummy,
continuous

OECDETCR and
other sources

Ownership [legal] unbundling
(Privatization) associated with no change
in [lower] (higher) P.

Hyland (2016)

EU27 +
Norway

200111

E

P industrial users

FE, GMM

Yes

Unbundling

-

various

Correlation between prices and
restructuring is statistically nil

Nagayama
(2007)

83 developing
countries

198502

E

industrial and
residential prices

OLS, FE,
RE

No

various regulatory
reform indices

dummy;
interactions

various

Coexistence of an independent regulator
and unbundling associated with lower
prices, but results vary greatly across
countries.

Nagayama
(2009)

78 developing
countries

198503

E

industrial and
residential prices

FE, RE, IV

No

liberalization

score

various

Liberalizations associated with price
increases

Reference
Bacchiocchi et
al. (2011)

Results
Mixed evidence: regulation reduces P,
but technological and demand-side
factors have more explanatory power.

Notes: Industry: E = electricity; G = gas; W = water; T = telecommunications; Tr = transportation; various = more than one industry (jointly). Estimator: FE = Fixed effects; RE = random effects; GMM = generalized
method of moments; AR(1) = Autoregressive model of order 1; LSDV = least-squares dummy variables; VECM = Vector error correction model. Dynamic: “yes” if lags of the dependent variable or autoregressive error
terms are included. PFR proxy description: ARI = aggregate regulatory index (typically the sample average of underlying PFR proxies); PO = public ownership; ER = Entry regulation; VI = vertical integration; MS =
market share.
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Table 2. Summary of empirical analyses of the effect of PFR in network industries: Productivity, Investment and other
performance variables
Sample

Model

Countries

Period Industry

OECD

197598

E, G, W,
T, P, Tr

Asane-Otoo
(2016)

OECD

199012

E

Bacchiocchi
and Florio
(2008)

UK

197998

Bacchiocchi
et al. (2005)

UK

Belloc et al.
(2013)

PFR proxy

Estimator

Dynamic

Description

Transf.

Source

FE, GMM

Yes

ARI, ER, PO

-

OECD-ETCR

CO2, NOx, SOx
intensity

FE, correlated
RE

No

ER, VI, PO

Dummy

OECD-ETCR

Emission intensity is negatively
correlated with the degree of
competition

various
industries

various macroeconomic
variables

VECM

Yes

privatization proceeds

-

Various

Privatizations have no long-run
impact on output; transitory impact
on investment and the public
expenditures

197999

various
industries

various macroeconomic
variables

VECM

Yes

privatization proceeds

-

Various

Privatizations have no long-run
impact on output

22 European
countries

197500

T

Market share of new
entrants

FE

No

Privatization,
Liberalization,

OECD-ETCR
and other
sources.

Liberalizations positively
associated with year-on-year
change of market share, especially
in the presence of a regulatory
authority.

Borghi et al.
(2016)

16 European
countries

200209

E

total factor productivity

FE

No

PO

Dummy

OECD-ETCR

Association between PO and
productivity depends on the quality
of government (QoG). Lower
[higher] productivity with poor
[high] QoG and PO

Bottasso and
Conti (2010).

11 EU
countries

198003

Tr

Production

GMM

Yes

ER

-

OECD ETCR

Elasticity of output with respect to
motorway is found to be lower for
countries with high degree of entry
barriers

Briglauer
(2014)

EU27

200511

T

Next-generation fiber
based adoption

FE

Yes

lines used by servicebased competitors as a
share of total regulated
wholesale broadband
lines

-

various

Adoption of fiber-based broadband
services negatively correlated with
the effectiveness of previous
regulation

Briglauer
(2015)

EU27

200412

T

Next-generation fiber
based investment

FE

Yes

lines used by servicebased competitors as a
share of total regulated
wholesale broadband
lines

-

various

Broadband access regulation
negatively correlates with
investment in new fiber
infrastructure

Cambini and
Rondi (2010)

23 firms in 5
EU countries

199707

E, G

Investment rate

OLS, FE, GMM

Yes

Incentive, rate of return
regulation and PO

dummy

various

Investment rate is lower under rate
of return regulation than under

Reference
Alesina et al.
(2005)

Dependent variable
Investment/capital stock
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Results
Deregulation, entry liberalization
and privatization have a positive
long-run effect on investment.

incentive regulation
Clò et al.
(2017)

27 EU member
states, Norway,
Turkey

199012

E

CO2 emissions and
intensity.

FE, RE

No

PO, Market structure

Erdogdu
(2011a)

92 countries

198208

E

Performance of
electricity industry

FE, RE

No

Erdogdu
(2013)

27 IEA member 1974countries
08

E

government spending in
energy R&D

FE, RE

Grajek and
Röller (2012)

20 EU
countries

199706

T

Tangible fixed assets as
proxy for investment

Gugler et al.
(2013)

16 European
countries

199808

E

Howard and
Mazaheri
(2009)

154 countries

199007

Kim et al.
(2012)

OECD ETCR

Increase in public ownership
associated with a reduction of both
emissions and carbon intensity.

Composite reform score squared

various

Reforms have a limited impact on
the efficiency of the market.

No

Composite reform score -

various

Reforms negatively associated with
government R&D spending

system OLS and
IV with FE

Yes

ARI

-

Plaut
Economics

Entry regulation discourages
investment by incumbents and
entrants

Aggregate investments
in generation,
distribution and
transmission assets

Panel
cointegration,
FE, GMM

Yes

ER, PO, VI, other

scores and OECD and
dummies other sources

Establishment of a wholesale
market or free choice of supplier
boosts investment; unbundling
decreases investment

T

Tech. Distribution
indices for internet use
and mobile phone
adoption

FE + lagged dep. Yes
Var or AR(1)
error term

Privatization,
liberalization,
regulatory separation
and de-politicization

Dummy

World
Information
Access project

Privatization and liberalization do
not spur the diffusion information
and communication technologies
(ITCs). Regulatory separation is
beneficial for diffusion of ITCs

70 firms
1990across15 OECD 08
countries

E

R&D expenditure

FE Tobit

No

ER

-

OECD-ETCR
and other
sources

Entry liberalization associated with
lower R&D

Koo et al.
(2013)

35 developing
countries

199001

E

power service efficiency
(power transmission and
distribution losses)

FE, RE, GEE

No

Private participation

log

World Bank’s
PPI database.

Private participation negatively
correlated with efficiency.

Nardi (2012)

14 European
countries

200110

E

Quality of transmission
network

corrected LSDV

Yes

Unbundling

scores

various

Association between ownership
unbundling and grid investments is
not statistically significant.

Nardotto et al.
(2015)

UK

2009

T

Speed of connection

OLS

No

Dummy = 1 if line
served by LLU entrant

-

OfCom

Local loop unbundling (LLU) has
increased average broadband speed.

Nepal et al.
(2016)

29 electricity
distribution
networks, New
Zealand

199609

E

quality of service

FE, RE

No

ownership unbundling

dummy

various

Duration and frequency of supply
interruptions in electricity
distribution negatively associated
with ownership unbundling

Polemis
(2016)

30 OECD
countries

197511

E

indicators of electricity
performance (capacity,
generation, productivity)

FE, GMM

Yes

ARI and others

OECD-ETCR

Association between privatisation
and electricity performance (labour
productivity and installed capacity)
is either negative or statistically
indistinguishable from zero

Polemis and
Stengos

30 OECD
countries

197513

E

indicators of electricity
performance (capacity,

panel threshold

no

ARI

OECD-ETCR

Reforms positively correlated with
electricity performance in non-
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-

-

(2017)

generation, productivity)

liberalized countries

Pompei
(2013)

19 EU
countries

199507

E

TFP growth

GMM

Yes

ARI, ER, VI, PO

-

OECD-ETCR

Increased stringency of entry
regulation negatively impacts on
productivity

Prati et al.
(2013)

over 90
developed and
developing
countries

197306

E, T

GDP growth

FE, GMM

Yes

ARI

-

legislation and
official
documents

Association between liberalization
and growth is statistically
indistinguishable from zero

Zhang et al.
(2005)

25 developing
countries

198501

E

per-capita electricity
generation and installed
generation capacity

FE

No

Regulation;
Competition;
Privatization;
Sequencing dummy
variables

dummies

Various

Generation and generation capacity
positively associated with the
presence of an independent
regulatory authority and by the
introduction of competition before
privatization

Zhang et al.
(2008)

36 developing
countries

198503

E

per-capita electricity
generation and installed
generation capacity

FE

No

Composite regulatory
index; competition;
public ownership

dummies
and score

Various

Privatization and regulation do not
lead to higher electricity generation
and installed generation capacity;
competition associated with
performance improvements

Notes: Industry: E = electricity; G = gas; W = water; T = telecommunications; Tr = transportation; various = more than one industry (jointly). Estimator: FE = Fixed effects; RE = random effects; GMM = generalized
method of moments; AR(1) = Autoregressive model of order 1; LSDV = least-squares dummy variables; VECM = Vector error correction model. Dynamic: “yes” if lags of the dependent variable or autoregressive error
terms are included. PFR proxy description: ARI = aggregate regulatory index (typically the sample average of underlying PFR proxies); PO = public ownership; ER = Entry regulation; VI = vertical integration; MS =
market share.
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Table 3. Summary of empirical analyses of the effect of PFR in network industries: customers' satisfaction as dependent variable
Sample

Model

Countries

Period

Industry

over 16000
citizens in EU
countries

2002

T, E, P,
Tr

Fiorio and
Florio (2011)

EU15

2000,
2002,
2004

E

Fiorio et al.
(2013)

over 14000
citizens in 33
European cities

2009

Florio and
Poggi (2010)

7 / 10 EU
countries

1994-05 /
2004-05

Reference
Ferrari et al.
(2011)

Dependent
variable
Consumers'
satisfaction

PFR proxy

Estimator

Dynamic

Description

Transf.

Source

RE

No

ARI

-

OECD ETCR

Results
Customers’ satisfaction is negatively
associated with the privatization and
liberalization

Consumers'
satisfaction

Probit

Yes, lagged
ETCR data

ER, PO and a
combination of those
indices

dummy

OECDETCR

Satisfaction for the price paid is higher when
there are bot PO and liberalization

Tr

Consumers'
satisfaction

Probit

No

PO, Deregulation

categorical

various

Satisfaction higher in cities where local
transportation is managed by a monopolistic,
integrated service organization

E, G

Energy
deprivation

Static and
dynamic
Probit

Yes

ER, VI, PO and a
combination of those
indices

-

OECDETCR

Probability of deprivation is positively
affected by privatization; the effect of
liberalization is not statistically
distinguishable from zero

Notes: Industry: E = electricity; G = gas; W = water; T = telecommunications; Tr = transportation; various = more than one industry (jointly). Estimator: FE = Fixed effects; RE = random effects; GMM = generalized
method of moments; AR(1) = Autoregressive model of order 1; LSDV = least-squares dummy variables; VECM = Vector error correction model. Dynamic: “yes” if lags of the dependent variable or autoregressive error
terms are included. PFR proxy description: ARI = aggregate regulatory index (typically the sample average of underlying PFR proxies); PO = public ownership; ER = Entry regulation; VI = vertical integration; MS =
market share.
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